Greg Reeson is an Army officer and freelance writer who lives with his wife and children in Fort Lee, VA. He has served two tours in Iraq, one as a Battalion Operations Officer (S3-responsible for force protection, convoy movements, mission assignments, etc.) and once as a Company Commander.
He is a frequent contributor to The New Media Journal and The Land of the Free; his columns have appeared in several online and print publications, including
The Veterans' Voice, The Washington Times, GOPUSA.com,
OpinionEditorials.com., and The Army Times.
Dealing with Iran
Greg C. Reeson
Strategic Forecasting (STRATFOR), a private geopolitical intelligence company based in Austin, recently published an analysis stating that the United States was attempting “…to make Iran feel isolated, make Iran fear that its foes are on the verge of using military force, make Iran feel like talks with the United States are the least-bad option.” And, STRATFOR notes, dialogue between Washington and Tehran is exactly what’s needed right now to improve the security situation in Iraq, thereby providing American military forces the opportunity to draw down and refocus their mission to one of training Iraqi security forces instead of actively engaging in combat operations.
The bottom line, and I agree with STRATFOR on this, is that the conflict in Iraq is primarily a struggle for influence between the United States and Iran. We want an Iraq that can serve as a buffer to rising Iranian influence and power in the Middle East and Iran wants a Shiite-friendly government in Baghdad that is unwilling and incapable of threatening its Persian neighbor. That is primarily why Iran is meddling in Iraqi affairs, including training and arming insurgent elements that are attacking, wounding and killing American soldiers. The goal from Tehran’s point of view is that Iran must prevent the United States from achieving its objectives in Iraq because the accomplishment of Washington’s goals would directly threaten Iranian interests in the region. And that is why President Bush refuses to give up the fight, a move that would allow Iran to fill the power vacuum that will inevitably result from an abrupt American departure from Iraq.
With the continued lack of political progress by the Iraqi government and the surge of American forces in Iraq necessarily coming to an end in the not-too-distant future, President Bush is ratcheting up the pressure on Tehran by enlisting once-again friendly European nations in the effort to isolate Iran on the international stage. These efforts are having an effect, and tougher sanctions currently being considered by the European Union, coupled with the threat of possible war by France over the nuclear impasse, could cause Tehran to take another look at its strategic position vis-à-vis the United States.
But here is where we have to be careful in any dealings with the clerics in Tehran or the lunatic they call a president. Any diplomatic engagement must be from a position of strength, and not from a position of concession. We cannot bow to Iranian demands for the lifting of sanctions, and we cannot allow Iran to seize control in the center or south of Iraq. One of the reasons behind President Bush’s surge of troops into Iraq was to put the Iranians on notice that the United States would be staying for the long haul, and that the presence of American troops on Iran’s border was a reality that Tehran would have to deal with for the foreseeable future. It is true that we cannot sustain the surge indefinitely, but it is also true now that instead of a massive reduction in U.S. forces in Iraq, significant numbers of troops will remain actively engaged for quite some time.
That fact not only makes Iran nervous, it provides some level of reassurance and comfort to Middle East allies like Israel, Saudi Arabia, Jordan and Egypt, all of whom are fearful of rising Iranian influence in the region. The French, Dutch and German governments are getting on board with the United States, and we should use that leverage to press Iran even harder, with meaningful sanctions and with the possible use of force, to stop interfering in Lebanon and the Palestinian territories, to restrain its operatives in Iraq, and to work with the United Nations to resolve the questions surrounding Iran’s nuclear program.
Any sign of weakness on the part of the United States, or our European allies, will be seized upon by Tehran as an opportunity to continue pushing for Iranian dominance in the Middle East, backed by the eventual possession of a nuclear arsenal.
The Iraq War is Not Lost, Yet
Greg C. Reeson
There’s been a noticeable decrease in the anti-war rhetoric coming out of Washington lately, no doubt because there has been a noticeable lack of bad news coming out of Iraq. Each day, more critics of President Bush’s Iraq policy are being forced to recognize that things on the ground do in fact seem to be getting better.
Even Reuters, which can almost always be counted on to give us nothing but the bad and the ugly, has now reported the good: that Iraq seems to be experiencing some positive trends and that the violence is showing signs of being under control. In a story this past week, Reuters correspondent Aseel Kami wrote that levels of violence in Iraq have decreased significantly since the last of President Bush’s surge troops arrived in late June, citing statistics provided by the Iraqi Interior Ministry that show a drop of 70 percent for violent incidents.
So what’s going on? It would appear that the President’s strategy is working. With levels of violence decreasing, and with Sunnis in al-Anbar and elsewhere turning against al-Qaeda in Iraq elements, a level of security conducive to political compromise is being provided in Baghdad and other key areas. According to the report, the number of car bombings in Baghdad is down 67 percent, the number of roadside bombings is down 40 percent, and the number of bodies found on the streets of Baghdad is down 28 percent. In al-Anbar Province, which was once written off as a lost cause by a U.S. Marine Colonel serving there, Reuters reports that violent deaths are down by more than 80 percent.
Now, it’s important to note that violence increased elsewhere as insurgents and al-Qaeda elements abandoned the sites targeted by the surge, with Reuters noting that Nineveh Province has experienced a 129 percent increase in car bombings and a 114 percent increase in violent deaths. But the difference between now and last year is that the new tactics developed and implemented by General Petraeus call for maintaining troop levels in areas cleared of insurgents and terrorists. American forces are on the offensive and pressure is being maintained on the individuals and groups perpetrating the violence. Simply put, insurgents and terrorists are running out of places to hide because General Petraeus is taking away the game of “chase the bad guy” that American troops played for far too long.
It is true that American forces cannot sustain surge troop levels indefinitely, and that over the near term the number of brigades in Iraq will have to be reduced. But the surge strategy is succeeding in buying time, not only for Iraqi political leaders to work out a compromise, but for Iraqi security forces to continue to train, draw equipment, increase proficiency, gain experience, and weed out infiltrators within their ranks who are more interested in tribal and sectarian loyalties than in a prosperous and stable Iraq.
This is a slow, often painful process. Insurgencies are messy affairs and there are no quick solutions. What we are doing now is working militarily, with American casualties for October at the lowest level in nearly two years. That’s quite a drop from what we’ve experienced before, and a casualty rate of less than one per day in the middle of a violent war is historically low for American conflicts. Of course, each death is a tragedy. But the dead have not died in vain. Their efforts are reaping tangible benefits and the people of Iraq are more secure now than they have been in the past three years.
In order to sustain the gains we have made in the past four months, though, one of two things has to happen. Either Iraqi politicians need to put sectarian differences and personal power aspirations aside and work out a substantive compromise that will allow for national reconciliation, or Iraqi Army and police forces need to achieve a level of proficiency that will allow them to take over security operations from American troops.
So far there has been little to no progress on the political front, but the more stable security environment is still in its infancy. Opposing factions will be understandably cautious and it will likely take some time to get everyone to the bargaining table. We can provide that time for a little while longer, but we cannot do it indefinitely. At some point Iraqi security forces will have to take responsibility for their country, even in the absence of political accommodation.
There has been much criticism of the ability of Iraqi forces to take over security operations, and truthfully, their performance record has been mixed. But they are becoming more proficient each day, weeding out the bad actors and standing up for their country. Force training takes time, and it is important to note that the training effort did not begin once the invasion of Iraq was complete. The training effort as it exists today is barely over two years old. The enormity of the task should not be underestimated, either. Training military forces to fight an insurgency is complex under the best of conditions, let alone in the middle of a vicious fight.
It is clear that progress is being made on the security front, and the training of Iraqi security forces continues in earnest while we push hard for the political reconciliation that will ultimately be necessary for a peaceful and prosperous Iraq. This war is not yet lost, and we owe it to the Iraqi people to provide them with as much time as we can, so that they are in the best position possible to save their nation.
The Politics of Withdrawal
Greg Reeson
Almost as soon as Secretary of Defense Robert Gates announced his inclination to support a "pause" in Iraq troop withdrawals this summer, the campaign teams of the two contenders for the Democratic Party's nomination for president, Senators Obama and Clinton, issued press releases critical of Gates' position and reiterated their calls for ending the Iraq war. But the reality is, political primary rhetoric aside, that either a President Obama or a President Clinton would find themselves with little choice upon assuming the presidency but to continue the Iraq policies put in place by President Bush.
Both Democratic candidates have stated unequivocally that they intend to rapidly withdraw American forces from Iraq, and both candidates have Iraq withdrawal plans posted on their campaign web sites. The television and radio airwaves are full of video clips and sound bytes proclaiming that the war will come to a rapid end if a Democrat is elected to the White House. But both candidates probably realize, whether they would admit it publicly or not, that neither will be able to fully make good on their withdrawal pledges.
The Obama plan, released in September of last year, says the Illinois Senator would withdraw one to two combat brigades per month with all combat troops out of Iraq by the end of 2008. Obviously, the plan would have had to be implemented immediately, and the Obama timeline has by now shifted into 2009. However, recognizing that the realities of the situation in Iraq and in the broader Middle East may prevent a rapid withdrawal, the Obama plan also gives the Senator a way out. According to the plan, the withdrawal would be done in phases, directed by the military commanders on the ground in Iraq in consultation with Iraqi government officials. That provision leads one to assume that if General Petraeus, or whoever else might be in command during an Obama presidency, provided military advice recommending significant troop levels in Iraq for the safeguarding of U.S. national security interests, that advice would be heeded and the withdrawal would be "paused."
No matter what he says on the campaign trail, Senator Obama clearly understands that he cannot really commit to a position today that may have to be executed under changed conditions in the future, a reality he expressed in late 2006 when he said, "We must exit Iraq, but not in a way that leaves behind a security vacuum filled with terrorism, chaos, ethnic cleansing and genocide that could engulf large swaths of the Middle East and endanger America…We have both moral and national security reasons to manage our exit in a responsible way."
The Clinton plan, posted on her campaign web site, involves three steps. As president, Senator Clinton would first start troop withdrawals from Iraq within sixty days of becoming commander-in-chief. Second, she would target American aid at any group working toward the stabilization of Iraq, which may or may not include the Iraqi government. And third, she would launch a new diplomatic initiative with regional and global players with an interest in a stable Iraq.
The only one that matters here, though, is the first step of her plan. The key word in that first step, and the one that gives Senator Clinton a way out if the realities in Iraq and the Middle East make a rapid withdrawal dangerous or impractical for the United States, is the word "start." According to her web site, Senator Clinton, as president, would direct the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Secretary of Defense, and the National Security Council to develop a plan to "start" bringing our troops home. The plan does not direct a target date for the completion of the withdrawal, nor does it provide the rate at which American forces would be pulled out of Iraq. The implication, of course, is that a Clinton administration would keep its Iraq troop level options open, and that the new president would retain the flexibility to increase or decrease troop levels in response to the conditions on the ground.
Those conditions have, by most measures, improved significantly over the past six months. U.S. and Iraqi casualties are down sharply, as are the number of attacks using improvised explosive devices, small arms fire, and indirect fire weapons such as mortars and rockets. The trend toward a more stable situation is the result of an increased American troop presence in Baghdad and al-Anbar Province, the implementation of a new counterinsurgency strategy that focuses more on the Iraqi population, the observance of a cease fire by Muqtada al-Sadr's Mehdi Army, and the much heralded "Sunni Awakening" that helped turn the tide against al-Qaeda in Iraq.
Politically, progress in Iraq has been painfully slow. Still, progress is being made. Just this week the Iraqi Parliament passed three critical measures that are viewed as positive steps toward national reconciliation: the budget law, a provincial powers law that will allow elections this year, and an amnesty law targeted at Sunnis who have been imprisoned by the thousands, sometimes without charges being brought against them.
To be sure, Iraq still has a long way to go before the American-led mission there can be deemed a success, and there is no guarantee that we will be able to bring about a stable and peaceful Iraq. That is precisely why General Petraeus, President Bush, and Secretary Gates are hinting at a "pause" in troop withdrawals after the last of the surge brigades leaves Iraq this summer. The U.S. military knows all too well that the hard-fought security gains achieved since last August could rapidly disappear if American forces are pulled out before Iraqi troops are fully ready to take over. A temporary halt in the redeployment of our forces makes sense because it gives commanders on the ground an opportunity to assess whether or not the security situation is holding or deteriorating.
Despite what may be said on the campaign trail, both Clinton and Obama are intelligent individuals who understand that conditions and realities can and do change. What is true today may or may not be true tomorrow, or next week, or next year. So both are able to pursue their party's nomination by appealing to the anti-war base during the primary season, knowing full well that they have left themselves enough wiggle room to make decisions on Iraq that are based on sound military and civilian advice and that best enable them to protect the national security interests of the United States.
Obama's Iran Challenge
Greg Reeson
8/8
As he neared the end of his much-heralded "fact-finding" tour of the Middle East and Europe late last week, Senator and Democratic presidential hopeful Barack Obama called on Iran to quickly agree to international demands to freeze its uranium enrichment program. His words are ringing hollow in Tehran, though, because Senator Obama has thus far refused to back his emphasis on talking with the credible threat of military force.
Speaking in France on Friday, Senator Obama said, "My expectation is that we're going to present a clear choice to Iran: change your behavior and you will be fully integrated into the international community with all the benefits that go with that. Continue your illicit nuclear program and the international community as a whole will ratchet up pressure with stronger and increased sanctions." On Saturday, Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad responded by saying Iran now had 6,000 centrifuges, twice the number needed for a nuclear program capable of weapons development.
Prior to Ahmadinejad's statement, Iranian representative Saeed Jalili had presented Tehran's response to the latest diplomatic effort produced by the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council and Germany at a Geneva meeting attended by the third ranking diplomat in the United States, Undersecretary of State William Burns. To no one's surprise, Iran's response was much the same as it has been for the past five years: a refusal to budge on its enrichment of uranium and a call for additional meetings in the future. So, the permanent five plus Germany announced a two-week deadline for Iran to comply or face a new round of sanctions from the Security Council. Senior Iranian cleric Ali Hashemi Rafsanjani immediately rejected the deadline.
Senator Obama wants to continue diplomatic efforts with Iran while refraining from discussing the possibility of using military force. He has repeatedly reminded us that he opposes the Bush Administration's "saber rattling," arguing that non-military options have not been exhausted. This view is shared by many on the left who either fear that we will provoke Iran into some sort of action that threatens the United States or who believe that military force is never justified. Speaking recently at a Center for Strategic and International Studies panel on Iran, former Carter national security adviser Zbigniew Brzezinski echoed the latter when he said, "We are perhaps unintentionally legitimating the idea of the use of force." He added, "The real option is to keep negotiating, be very tough on the sanctions, adopt more sanctions, make it more painful for the Iranians."
The problem is that nothing over the past five years has been painful for the Iranians. The ineffectiveness of the Security Council has demonstrated that meaningful multilateral sanctions are not likely to be forthcoming, and unilateral sanctions, such as those imposed by the United States and separately by the European Union, have historically had poor results. Gary Sick, a noted Iran expert and former Iran officer in the national security councils of the Ford, Carter, and Reagan administrations, recently told the Council on Foreign Relations, "On the U.S. side, there has been a recognition that our sanctions, which have been in place for thirteen years and have increased in severity over that time, have not in fact stopped Iran from building centrifuges and expanding its nuclear capability."
Iran will not be easily deterred. Leaders in Tehran have been working on nuclear energy technology for half a century, since President Eisenhower launched his Atoms for Peace Program in the 1950s. After the 1979 Islamic Revolution, concerns about Iran's program pushed western nations away, leaving Iran to continue its nuclear pursuits on its own. In the mid-1990s, Russia agreed to help Iran with its development of nuclear technology by building two reactors at Bushehr and by subsequently supplying the fuel for the reactors. When it was discovered in 2002 that Iran had been conducting clandestine fuel enrichment research, many western nations became alarmed and suspected that Iran was working to develop nuclear weapons, something Iran has repeatedly denied.
Could we live with a nuclear Iran? Probably. We have lived with other nuclear powers for decades and the threat of massive retaliation against Iran is probably enough to give Tehran pause before employing nuclear weapons against the United States, Israel, or any of Iran's Arab neighbors. The real threat is that of proliferation. A nuclear Iran would likely spur other Middle East nations to pursue their own nuclear programs, both as a counter to Iran and as a means for obtaining enhanced leverage in a very troubled region. That is the reason Iran's program must be dealt with, and soon.
Of course, a diplomatic solution is the preferred outcome. But diplomatic efforts have yielded little so far because to date the members of the Security Council have not adopted a unified position in opposition to Tehran's continued defiance. Russia and China, both with extensive financial interests in Iran, have refused to back meaningful sanctions, forcing the United States, France and the United Kingdom to accept watered down resolutions that have had little impact. Our European allies are strictly averse to the use of force to compel Iran to comply with the U.N.'s demands, and the United States is unable to unilaterally take meaningful military action while tied down in Iraq and Afghanistan.
But the day is coming when the United States will be able to take effective military action, if necessary, against Iran. The inevitable drawdown of military forces from Iraq, enabled by the tactical successes of the past year, will free up critical capabilities from across the services, even if some resources are diverted to the increasingly difficult fight in Afghanistan.
And while a resort to violence against Iran should be the last option considered, it must remain an option nonetheless. The option to use military force need not be exercised, but without it diplomacy lacks a meaningful mechanism for persuading Iran to work with the international community. The challenge for Senator Obama is to embrace the notion that diplomacy can only be effective when it is backed by the credible threat of military action. If he can do that, his plan for continued dialogue with Iran will carry significantly more weight.
Carter, Hamas, and Negotiating with Terrorists
Former President Jimmy Carter raised more than a few eyebrows with his Middle East excursion for talks with leaders of the terrorist group Hamas. Many articles have been written about Carter's motives, his hidden agenda, his bias against Israel, and his demonstrated distaste for all things Bush. And while it is understandable that many would be outraged by the fact that a former president would take it upon himself to undermine the current president by meeting with Hamas, Carter's trip raises the bigger issue of whether or not we should negotiate with terrorists as a means for seeking peace in the Middle East.
One of the leading arguments for negotiating with terrorists is that no true peace can be achieved unless all interested parties are involved in political and violence-ending discussions. Carter himself has made this argument, saying that no lasting peace can be achieved between Israel and the Palestinians unless Hamas is part of the process. The problem, though, is that dealing directly with Hamas confers a sense of legitimacy to a terrorist organization that many, including this author, find inappropriate and unacceptable.
Of course, some would argue that legitimacy was granted to Hamas by virtue of the group's victory in the 2006 Palestinian parliamentary elections. However, I would argue that Hamas' electoral victory means only that the Palestinian people, and not the American people, are forced to deal with the group. Whether Hamas was elected in a free and fair manner, and therefore serves as the proper representative of the Palestinian people, is irrelevant. What matters is that Carter is asking Israel, and in essence, the United States, to sit down at the negotiating table with an organization that is committed to the destruction of the Jewish state and has used terrorist tactics to kill hundreds of people, including Americans, over the past two decades.
To understand the mindset of Hamas, one only has to read the words of the group's foreign minister, Mahmoud al-Zahar, published in an opinion piece by the Washington Post this past week. In the article, Zahar lambastes the United States and Israel, and calls Carter's trip "sensible." He refers to the killings of innocent Israeli civilians as "resistance," and lays out Hamas' conditions for even beginning discussions with Israel: withdrawal to 1967 borders; dismantling of all Jewish settlements; complete Israeli withdrawals from the West Bank and the Gaza Strip; an abandonment of Israeli claims to Jerusalem; a release of all Palestinian prisoners; and an end to the Israeli blockade of the Palestinian territories. Of course, there is no mention in the article about Hamas putting an end to the rockets that are pounding Israel on a daily basis, nor is there any mention of release for Corporal Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier held captive by Hamas since the summer of 2006. Instead, al-Zahar demands that Hamas be included in any political process without preconditions.
What Hamas has learned is that Israel and the West reward their use of violence and terrorist tactics. Israel has tried withdrawing from Palestinian areas before in exchange for promises of peace. Yet each time, reductions in the Israeli presence are met with more rockets, more kidnappings, and more suicide bombings. The United States condemns Hamas' actions, but the United Nations can accomplish little more than resolutions critical of Israel's "occupation" and imposition of economic sanctions against the Palestinians.
Another argument used by those in favor of negotiating with terrorists is that efforts should be made to support moderate actors while marginalizing the radicals within the group. This is considerably harder than it sounds. Moderates may be hesitant to come forward in an environment where hardliners dominate, and it is typically the radicals who are in control of groups that employ terrorist tactics. Besides, it is extremely difficult to talk to any member of a group that is attacking your country and your citizens, no matter how moderate some of its members may seem. Thus far, Hamas has failed to demonstrate its willingness to renounce violence in order to establish an environment conducive to negotiations for peace.
Negotiating with terrorists conveys a sense of weakness and tells terrorists everywhere that violent methods will at some point bring the West to the bargaining table. Communication with terrorists, through third parties such as regional allies, might be acceptable, but only to inform the terrorists that violence will not yield concessions. Communication is different than negotiation, and negotiation should not be an option until the violence has stopped.
Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Olmert was completely justified in not meeting with Carter while the former president was traveling through Israel. Despite his insistence that the trip was a personal mission of peace, Carter is recognized and accepted in the region as a former president of the United States, a title that brings with it a sense of legitimacy and reward that no private individual could ever convey. By meeting with Hamas, Carter showed his complete contempt for the Israeli government, U.S. diplomatic efforts in the region, and President George W. Bush. And he did nothing to convince Hamas to lay down its arms and use its political clout for the betterment of the Palestinian people.
Afghanistan and the Teekell Doctrine
By Greg Reeson
A week or so ago it was revealed that a leaked cable from a French diplomat claimed the British Ambassador to Afghanistan had referred to the current strategy against the Taliban and al Qaeda as "doomed to fail" and had called for the installation of an "acceptable dictator" as the best solution.
The news reports surrounding Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles' comments brought back memories of a conversation I had with a colleague over a few 12-year old scotches and some fine cigars. During that conversation, my colleague and friend offered up his theory on how best to pacify Iraq. Since his last name is Teekell, we dubbed it the Teekell Plan.
Before discussing the Teekell Plan, though, let's quickly review what's happening in Afghanistan right now. First, the Taliban has made a comeback. Feeling increasingly confident and financed by a lucrative drug trade, Taliban fighters are conducting more brazen attacks that are terrifying the Afghan population, killing increasing numbers of NATO soldiers, and creating the perception that the U.S.-led coalition is losing the war. Second, the Karzai government is corrupt and weak, and capable of exerting virtually no authority outside of Kabul.
Third, the Afghan Army and Police, while getting better, are still a long way from being able to do anything independently. The presence of coalition forces will be necessary for an extended period of time if Afghanistan is to have a military that is competent and answerable to the Afghan people. Fourth, NATO forces are hindering military operations more than they are helping them. National caveats, inadequate funding, capability shortfalls and insufficient troop levels force the United States, Canada, Great Britain, Denmark and The Netherlands to bear most of the combat and logistical burden. Finally, the lack of any real effort by Pakistan to establish some semblance of control over its side of the border means insurgent fighters are able to launch attacks against Afghan and coalition forces and then return to safe havens in Pakistan with near impunity. A new National Intelligence Estimate expected to be released soon reportedly says the situation in Afghanistan is spiraling out of control.
So the United States is reassessing its strategy. More U.S. troops are scheduled to deploy to Afghanistan. America is asking NATO for more troops and an easing of restrictions on how those troops operate. There is talk of direct negotiation with the Taliban, just not those associated with al Qaeda. But the reality is that NATO will not step up to the plate and agree to the requests made by the United States. And negotiations with the Taliban may or may not prove productive. In the end, elected governments and the Taliban are not really compatible.
Still, a new strategy is definitely in order. The Taliban is waging a war of attrition against our political will. We cannot continue on the current course indefinitely. And simply adding more U.S. forces won't do the trick. NATO and the United States currently have just over 50,000 troops in Afghanistan. The Soviets had more than 100,000. If they couldn't pacify the country with twice the number of soldiers, what makes us think we can with the resources available to us?
Our ultimate goal should be a stable and peaceful Afghanistan (notice I didn't say democratic – that's most likely a bridge too far) that does not ever again become a refuge for terrorists with global aspirations. A step toward that goal could very well be the implementation of an "acceptable dictator."
Returning to my colleague's proposal, the Teekell Plan's beauty is in its simplicity. It simply calls for the installation of a strong man, or dictator, in countries where ethnic strife makes it virtually impossible for the establishment of a normal society based on the rule of law and the common good. Let's face it. Democracy is not going to take hold in every country we would like it to. It's time to understand the reality of the situation and realize that Afghanistan is one of those places where the right dictator could bring order to the chaos. A U.S.-backed strong man that is at least tolerant of American interests is far preferable to the strategy we are currently employing.
That is not to say that implementation of the Teekell Plan would be easy. As my colleague explained, the Teekell Plan would be a bit problematic in Afghanistan because the central authority required under the plan would be difficult or impossible in certain parts of the country. Simply put, some areas in Afghanistan would be tough to control from Kabul or Kandahar. These areas would have to be isolated.
But it could be done. The last person to rule Afghanistan from Kabul was Mohammed Zahir Shah, and his reign lasted some forty years until he was ousted from power in a coup in 1973. All it takes is a strong man with a powerful personality and the loyalty of the security forces to keep the populace in check. Case in point: Saddam Hussein.
And since the Teekell Plan, which was originally conceived of as a strategy for Iraq, can be implemented in other places, such as Afghanistan, the term "plan" does not really suffice. As my colleague said to me in a recent email, the Teekell Plan is "applicable to just about any Third World sh*thole where there's very little rule of law and where power grows out of a gun…." Since the Teekell Plan can be applied in more than one region, another colleague noted, it is more fitting to label it the "Teekell Doctrine."
Perhaps it's time for the United States to consider implementing the Teekell Doctrine, or some variant of it, in Afghanistan and Iraq in order to bring some stability to two countries in desperate need of a break from war. Then the U.S. could relieve some of the stress on an overstretched military and free up forces to respond to other potential crises around the world.
Iraq: Planning a "Responsible" Withdrawal
On his first full day as Commander-in-Chief, President Barack Obama met with Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Admiral Michael Mullen, CENTCOM commander General David Petraeus, and Iraq commander General Raymond Odierno, and directed them to begin planning for a "responsible" military drawdown from Iraq. The language used by the President was significantly less restrictive than the 16-month timetable he repeatedly promised during the campaign season, and sufficiently broad enough to allow Mr. Obama to follow essentially the same course already embarked upon by his predecessor, George W. Bush.
In executing the President's directive, military planners will develop a wide range of options for U.S. forces in Iraq. The plans crafted by the Pentagon will be presented to Mr. Obama in the coming months, along with the potential consequences associated with each. Dozens of possible scenarios exist, depending on how much equipment is to be left behind for the Iraqis and how much risk the new administration is willing to deem acceptable. No matter how many alternatives the Defense Department comes up with, though, in the end there are only two generally acknowledged, broad courses of action: a steady withdrawal based on pre-determined dates or gradual adjustments to troop levels based on security conditions on the ground.
The former, of course, is what then-candidate Obama promised during the campaign, and is essentially what is laid out in the recently negotiated security pact governing the presence and conduct of U.S. military forces in Iraq. The latter represents the position held by former President Bush and most, if not all, of the senior military officers responsible for the war, including Petraeus and Odierno. Today's Iraq is not the Iraq that existed when Mr. Obama made his 16-month withdrawal pledge. The success of President Bush's surge of troops to Baghdad and al Anbar Province, accompanied by the continued improvement of Iraqi security forces and bottom-up political reconciliation, has created a much more stable and secure Iraq. While conditions on the ground have become significantly better than they were in early 2007, the overall situation remains fragile. But the path Iraq is on is clearly a positive one, and it is one in which President Obama could potentially fulfill his promise of withdrawal, albeit with a bit of creativity when it comes to defining what constitutes a "combat soldier."
Mr. Obama's campaign pledge centered around the withdrawal of "combat" troops from Iraq, while leaving open the possibility of a residual force of undetermined size and composition that would stay in the country to target terrorists and to provide training, advice, and logistics support to Iraqi security personnel and the Iraqi government. In military terms, combat forces are traditionally thought of as those forces (typically infantry, armor, etc.) that engage in actual fighting with the enemy. In Iraq, however, there are no defined front lines and every U.S. soldier, infantryman and truck driver alike, is a potential combatant. Additionally, since the fledgling Iraqi security forces need help in virtually every aspect of military operations, all soldier specialties have a place in the future force structure in Iraq.
In order to make good on his promise to remove U.S. combat forces, President Obama need only change the labels currently attached to troops conducting military missions in Iraq. For example, infantry units could be called "combat advisers," and tank units could be re-designated as "armor trainers." The re-labeling could take place all at once, be applied to new units arriving for their Iraq rotations, or some combination of the two. This option would allow the President to "reduce" the number of combat forces in Iraq without putting at risk the hard-won security progress that has been made over the past 18 months.
Critics of the U.S. troop presence in Iraq will quickly point out that this is simply a word game, and they would, of course, be right. But what's happening in Iraq right now is not a game. It is deadly serious, and the costs of failure would be catastrophic, for Iraq and for the entire Middle East. The potential consequences associated with a drawdown that does not take into account changing conditions on the ground must be considered in planning the United States' future in Iraq. To do otherwise would be both irresponsible and stupid. Mr. Obama is not a stupid man. In fact, he's demonstrated that he is quite the opposite. He knows that campaign rhetoric is one thing; the realities of the office he now holds are quite another.
The President's call for a "responsible" withdrawal from Iraq is probably an indication that the 16-month timeline is going to be very flexible, and that he will keep his options open so that troop levels can be reduced if security gains hold, or increased if necessary to prevent the collapse of the Iraqi government and the chaos that would no doubt follow the implosion of the Iraqi state. While adjustments to the oft-promised timetable for an exit of U.S. forces from Iraq might not sit well with some of Mr. Obama's core supporters, it seems, on initial glance at least, that the new Commander-in-Chief has a keen understanding not only of the gravity of the situation, but also that everything changes when you're the guy responsible for what follows after the orders you give are carried out.
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In Afghanistan, Obama Goes “All In”
By Greg Reeson
4/2/2009
The United States and its allies are in danger of losing the war in Afghanistan. The level of violence has risen steadily over the past seven years, the Taliban are in control of large portions of the countryside, insurgent elements operate with near impunity from safe havens in Pakistan, the Karzai government is corrupt and ineffective, and many NATO member states are proving to be more of a hindrance than a help due to national caveats that restrict the types of operations their troops can participate in and declining public support that prevents the dispatch of additional combat forces to fight Taliban and al Qaeda militants.
It was with these realities in mind that the UnitedStates unveiled last week its new strategy for Afghanistan and Pakistan, a comprehensive approach with a mission clearly stated by President Obama: “to disrupt, dismantle and defeat al Qaeda in Pakistan and Afghanistan, and to prevent their return to either country in the future.” By putting the full weight of the U.S. government behind the new strategy, President Obama has decided to go “all in” in an effort to turn this war around. The real question, though, is whether the United States has the stomach to see this fight through beyond an immediate push and through to a successful conclusion.
The U.S. strategy has six main elements: an increase in aid to Pakistan, a surge of military forces to Afghanistan, an accelerated training program for Afghan security forces, a reconciliation plan for moderate insurgents, an increase in civilian support to Afghanistan, and a regional diplomatic push to get neighboring states to take more responsibility for Afghanistan’s future.
The United States has been providing aid to the Pakistani government since the invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, and sadly has little to show for the billions of dollars spent thus far. Future allocations of American dollars will attempt to strengthen the Pakistani government and increase its ability to fight Islamic insurgents by targeting the aid more toward civilian institutions and less toward the Pakistani military. Whether this will work or not remains to be seen, but given the tremendous influence of the military in both government and societal affairs, the odds are not in our favor.
The next three elements of the strategy are all borrowed from the war in Iraq. Under President Bush a brigade combat team destined for Iraq was diverted to Afghanistan to help counter increased attacks by Taliban fighters. President Obama followed suit by ordering 21,000 more troops to Afghanistan (12,000 combat, 5,000 support, and 4,000 trainers) during 2009. The “surge” strategy, implemented so effectively in Iraq during 2007, is now being employed in Afghanistan. President Obama has also ordered an acceleration of the training of Afghan security forces in a manner similar to the effort undertaken in Iraq after years of neglecting the training of Iraqi army and police elements. Recognizing that some Taliban and al Qaeda fighters are motivated by reasons other than religious zeal, the new U.S. strategy calls for a reconciliation program that gives additional options to moderate, low-level insurgents motivated by money or other negotiable causes.
In sending more civilian experts from across the federal government to Afghanistan, the U.S. strategy is seeking to improve Afghan governance and support to the population. To be truly effective, though, these civilians will need to venture out from the capital, Kabul, and into the countryside. Counterinsurgency efforts are won or lost with the populace and it will be critical for governance and aid projects to be visible to the Afghan people. Finally, the new U.S. strategy calls for a strong diplomatic push throughout the region. Finding common ground among Afghanistan’s neighbors will be difficult, to be sure, given the different national interests involved. Still, the effort must be made in the hope that key regional players will recognize that stable and secure governments in Afghanistan and Pakistan are a benefit to all.
The road ahead promises to be difficult and some elements of the new U.S. strategy will be more successful than others. The key question on everyone’s mind is whether the United States has the staying power necessary to fully execute the strategy and ultimately, to secure victory in Afghanistan. Will our resolve wane when casualties inevitably rise as a result of taking the fight to the enemy with our beefed up military presence? Will we tire when progress is slow and difficult to come by? Will we rethink our strategy, and our effort, when this fight drags on year after year after year?
The answer to the question about our stomach for a prolonged and costly Afghan fight is critical, but it is not yet clear. The message we send to our allies, to the governments in Kabul and Islamabad, to Taliban and al Qaeda fighters, and to the people of Afghanistan and Pakistan is one that we had better get right. Any sign of weakness or wavering resolve will be seized upon by friend and foe alike, emboldening our enemies to wait out our departure, undermining support for government leaders in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and providing an opportunity for already skittish NATO member states to abandon what many consider to be a sinking ship. The United States has gone “all in,” and it is critical, now more than ever, that we follow up our new strategy with a sustained and public demonstration of our commitment to winning this war.
Losing Pakistan
Greg Reeson
5/06/09
Earlier this year I wrote an article in which I offered four steps the United States might take to prevent Pakistan from becoming a failed state. They were to strengthen the Pakistani government through targeted economic aid; to reorient the Pakistani military away from confrontation with India and toward the Islamic insurgency threatening Pakistan’s national survival; to assist Pakistan with economic and political reforms in the Federally Administered Tribal Areas; and to minimize the role of the ISI, Pakistan’s intelligence service that has long had ties to the Taliban. It has now become clear that anything the U.S. does will be too little, too late.
For too long the United States has viewed Pakistan as a secondary effort in the fight for Afghanistan. The primary focus has always been on rooting out the Afghan Taliban, defeating al Qaeda, and supporting the Karzai government in Kabul. Efforts directed at Pakistan were singularly focused on getting the Pakistani government to police its side of the Afghan-Pakistan border. The United States was slow to recognize that the true center of gravity was not in Afghanistan, but in neighboring Pakistan.
Pakistan has, over the past several years, become the global center of Islamic radicalism. The Pakistani armed forces are either unwilling or unable to stop the Taliban and other groups of militants, and the ISI still provides support to terrorist elements within Pakistan’s borders. The Pakistani government lacks public support and the economy is suffering greatly from the global financial crisis. Political and economic instability and military intransigence provide numerous opportunities for Islamists that promise order, stability and desperately needed social services. The conditions in Pakistan today actually make the Taliban look more attractive to the average citizen than the Pakistani government.
It’s no surprise that Islamic militants have increasingly been on the march. They smell blood and are moving in for the kill. In mid-February, the Pakistani government signed a peace deal with the Taliban that was supposed to end military operations in the Swat Valley and establish Islamic law, Sharia, in several parts of Pakistan’s northwest. The Malakand Accord, as it was called, was interpreted by the Taliban as a sign of weakness on the part of the Pakistani government. Rather than settling for the gains achieved under the peace deal, the Taliban began moving, closing to within 60 miles of the capital, Islamabad, just last month. The lesson to be learned is a simple one. There is no dealing with Islamic radicals. They view negotiations as nothing more than a mechanism for gaining some sort of an advantage, and now they’re getting close to Pakistan’s nuclear facilities.
The problem in Pakistan is only going to get worse in the foreseeable future, and the world will probably witness yet another military takeover in Islamabad. This is not necessarily a bad thing, at least until the threat from Islamic extremists is brought under control. It is also not uncommon in Pakistan’s history. Since the country was born shortly after World War II, it has been under military rule for slightly more than 30 years. Just over half of its life has been controlled by the Pakistani military and not by civilian governments. The most recent military government was the regime of General Pervez Musharraf, which came to power in a coup in 1999. This time around the country could be led by General Ashfaq Kayani, the current chief of staff of the Pakistani Army. One thing is certain: the current path that Pakistan is on cannot continue. If it does, the Pakistani government will fail. A failed Pakistani state would be the ultimate nightmare scenario, with horrific consequences not just for Pakistan, but for the entire international community.
The United States has finally recognized that it is Pakistan that is the central front in the global fight against Islamic extremism. It does not appear, however, that the Pakistani government has reached the same conclusion. There have been a few Pakistani military offensives, but the effort has been half-hearted at best. Even the current operation in Buner has a time limit on it, making it clear that the Pakistani government does not intend to stay and hold the territory it is currently fighting to take back from the Taliban.
Pakistan is losing its fight against the extremists, and the world is losing Pakistan. The alarms have been sounded, but not much else is likely to happen. The simple reality is that once you get past the rhetoric, the calls for increased Pakistani action, and the pleas for international assistance, it’s not hard to see that the United States is watching from the sidelines and is essentially powerless to do anything more.
